EU Shadow Fleet Sanctions: Can Equasis Prove Port State Control (PSC) Avoidance?

Since June 2024, the European Union has increasingly used vessel-specific restrictive measures as an instrument against what is commonly described as Russia’s “shadow fleet”. Article 3s of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 permits vessels meeting specified criteria to be included in Annex XLII to that Regulation. Once listed, a vessel becomes subject to extensive restrictions, including prohibitions relating to access to EU ports and anchorage zones, operation, crewing, insurance, financing and the provision of various maritime services. The relevant listing mechanism was introduced by Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1745 and has subsequently been expanded through successive sanctions packages.

As at 30 July 2026, Annex XLII contains 673 vessels. The 21st sanctions package added 41 vessels to the 632 vessels already designated. The list has therefore developed within little more than two years from a relatively targeted measure into one of the EU’s most extensive vessel-sanctions regimes.

A considerable number of these vessels have been listed under Article 3s(2)(b) of Regulation No 833/2014. In its current form, that provision concerns vessels which transport Russian crude oil, petroleum products or certain mineral products and which also engage in the shipping practices referred to in IMO Assembly Resolution A.1192(33). The decisive wording requires the vessel to “transport crude oil or petroleum products … that originate in Russia or are exported from Russia” and to “practice irregular and high-risk shipping practices”. Both elements must be established. The transport of Russian oil is not, by itself, sufficient for listing under that criterion.

The significance of IMO Resolution A.1192(33)

Article 3s(2)(b) incorporates an external maritime standard by referring expressly to IMO Assembly Resolution A.1192(33). That Resolution was adopted in December 2023 to promote action against illegal operations by the “dark fleet” or “shadow fleet”.

The IMO definition is narrower and more legally structured than the term “shadow fleet” is sometimes assumed to be in political discourse. Resolution A.1192(33) describes shadow-fleet vessels as ships engaged in illegal operations for the purpose of circumventing sanctions, evading safety or environmental requirements, avoiding insurance costs or engaging in other illegal activities. It then identifies several forms of conduct which may fall within that definition. One of them is “intentionally avoiding flag State and port State control (PSC) inspections”.

The word intentionally is important. The Resolution does not treat every absence of an inspection, every lengthy interval between inspections or every gap in a commercial database as proof of irregular conduct. Intentional avoidance requires conduct attributable to the vessel, its owner, operator or manager that is capable of preventing, frustrating or circumventing an inspection and is undertaken for that purpose.

This distinction is particularly important where the Council bases a listing on the proposition that too much time elapsed between two port State control inspections.

Who decides when a port State control inspection takes place?

Port State control is not a private inspection service that a shipowner orders at regular intervals. It is the exercise of regulatory authority by a port State over foreign vessels calling at its ports.

The IMO defines port State control as the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that the condition of the vessel and its equipment comply with international rules and that the ship is properly manned and operated. The applicable procedures are governed at IMO level and implemented through regional arrangements such as the Paris MoU, the Tokyo MoU and the Black Sea MoU.

The vessel operator must, of course, comply with the applicable conventions, maintain valid certificates, cooperate with duly authorised inspectors and remedy any deficiencies identified. Those obligations should not be confused, however, with the decision to initiate a port State control inspection. Whether a vessel is inspected, when the inspection takes place and what form it takes are matters for the competent public authority.

This remains true where a regional port State control regime operates a risk-based targeting system. Under the Paris MoU, for example, ships are selected by reference to factors such as vessel type, age, inspection history, flag performance and company performance. High-Risk Ships generally become eligible for inspection within a window of five to six months following the previous inspection in the Paris MoU region.

That interval is a targeting parameter for the participating authorities. It is not a six-month statutory deadline imposed on the shipowner. A vessel does not breach the Paris MoU merely because no authority inspects it within that period. Nor can a Paris MoU targeting interval simply be converted into a globally applicable inspection obligation, irrespective of the ports visited and the regional port State control arrangements concerned.

Consequently, a listing assessment that treats the absence of a port State control inspection within six months as an omission by the vessel operator reverses the allocation of responsibilities under the international maritime oversight system. It attributes to the operator a decision that belongs to the competent authorities.

A long inspection interval is not the same as intentional avoidance

The absence of an inspection record may justify further enquiries. It does not, without more, establish intentional avoidance.

To demonstrate avoidance within the meaning of Resolution A.1192(33), the Council would need to identify conduct that goes beyond the mere passage of time. Relevant evidence could potentially include a deliberate refusal to permit an inspection, the submission of false information to maritime authorities, concealment of the vessel’s identity, or operational decisions specifically designed to prevent the vessel from coming within the reach of competent inspectors.

In an appropriate case, a pattern of deliberately avoiding ports at which inspections were expected might also be relevant, particularly where the vessel would otherwise have had a commercial reason to call at those ports. Similarly, ship-to-ship transfers or offshore cargo operations could form part of an avoidance strategy where the evidence demonstrates that they were used specifically to replace port calls and thereby evade regulatory scrutiny.

The fact that a vessel trades on routes that do not result in frequent port State control inspections is not sufficient by itself. Commercial routes are ordinarily determined by chartering arrangements, cargo requirements, terminal availability, navigational conditions and the instructions of contractual counterparties. A finding of intentional avoidance requires evidence connecting the route or operational structure to an intention to evade inspections.

The distinction is therefore between an objective absence of inspections, which may have many explanations, and intentional conduct designed to produce that absence. Article 3s(2)(b), read together with Resolution A.1192(33), concerns the latter.

Equasis is a screening database, not conclusive evidence

A related evidentiary problem arises where the Council relies on Equasis to determine whether a port State control inspection took place.

Equasis is an important maritime information platform. It consolidates safety, ownership, classification, insurance and inspection information obtained from numerous public and private data providers. It is useful for preliminary screening and for identifying issues requiring further examination.

It is not, however, an exhaustive official register of every inspection performed anywhere in the world. Equasis itself states that it “does not rule out the possibility of inadvertent omissions or inaccuracies”. Its terms also provide that neither Equasis nor the participating port State control regimes accept liability for reliance on the accuracy, completeness or timeliness of the information displayed. Users who identify inaccurate information are expressly invited to submit supporting documents so that the matter can be reviewed. (equasis.org)

The structure of the platform explains that limitation. Equasis collates data supplied by different authorities, classification societies, insurers and commercial providers. Whether an inspection appears in the database may depend on whether the relevant authority participates in the data exchange, whether the inspection was transmitted, how quickly it was transmitted, whether the vessel was correctly identified and whether the relevant data fields were successfully matched.

An inspection may therefore have taken place even though it is not displayed in Equasis. Conversely, the appearance of information in Equasis does not automatically establish that every element of the entry is accurate or current.

This becomes legally significant where official evidence exists. A port State control report, inspection certificate or confirmation issued by the competent maritime authority is direct evidence of the inspection. Equasis is, by comparison, an aggregated secondary source. Where the two conflict, it is difficult to justify treating the absence of an Equasis entry as more probative than an official document issued by the authority that conducted the inspection.

Equasis should therefore be used as an investigative starting point, not as a substitute for verification. A Council assessment which assumes that no inspection occurred merely because no corresponding entry appears in Equasis risks converting a database omission into an adverse legal finding.

The cumulative evidentiary problem

The combination of these two assumptions can produce a particularly problematic result.

First, the Council may infer from Equasis that no inspection took place. Secondly, it may calculate the period since the previous inspection and conclude that the interval was too long. Thirdly, it may attribute that interval to the vessel operator and characterise it as intentional avoidance.

Each step requires independent verification. The Equasis record may be incomplete. The inspection interval may derive from a regional targeting system that does not apply to the ports concerned. Most importantly, the timing of port State control inspections is generally determined by public authorities rather than by the vessel operator.

A lawful listing assessment must therefore identify the conduct relied upon and establish the necessary link between that conduct and the alleged avoidance. The mere absence of database records does not demonstrate conduct. Nor does an inspection interval establish intention.

This does not mean that port State control history is irrelevant. A complete absence of inspections over an extended period, combined with unusual trading patterns, concealed ownership, AIS manipulation, false registration or evidence of deliberate avoidance of regulatory jurisdictions may contribute to an overall assessment. What is impermissible is to treat the inspection interval itself as a self-standing substitute for evidence of intentional conduct.

Judicial clarification remains outstanding

The interpretation of Article 3s(2)(b) and its reference to IMO Resolution A.1192(33) is now the subject of several annulment actions before the General Court of the European Union. Those proceedings raise questions concerning the evidence required to establish irregular and high-risk shipping practices and whether the factual material relied upon by the Council is sufficient to support individual vessel listings.

As at 30 July 2026, no published judgment of the EU Courts appears to have decided the specific question whether lengthy intervals between port State control inspections, or the absence of an inspection entry in Equasis, can by themselves establish that a vessel intentionally avoided flag State or port State control inspections.

The issue must therefore be regarded as legally unresolved. The forthcoming judgments will be important not only for the vessels directly concerned but also for the evidentiary standard governing the EU’s broader shadow-fleet listing practice.

Conclusion

The EU is entitled to take effective action against vessels genuinely engaged in unsafe or illegal operations. However, the seriousness of the resulting restrictions makes accurate fact-finding essential.

Equasis is a valuable maritime intelligence source, but it is neither infallible nor exhaustive. Missing data cannot automatically be equated with a missing inspection. More fundamentally, the frequency of port State control inspections is generally determined by public authorities. A vessel operator cannot be accused of intentionally avoiding an inspection merely because an authority did not carry one out within an interval subsequently regarded by the Council as appropriate.

Intentional avoidance requires identifiable conduct and evidence of purpose. Until the EU Courts clarify the applicable standard, listings based primarily on Equasis gaps and inspection intervals remain open to substantial legal challenge.

This article reflects the legal position and publicly available information as at 30 July 2026.

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Your contact person: Dr. Hendrik Müller-Lankow, German/EU lawyer.