EU Sanctions Extended to 2029: Can the New Three-Year Period Be Challenged?
On 22 September 2026, the Council of the European Union fundamentally changed the renewal mechanism for individual EU sanctions relating to Russia.
By Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2161, the Council extended Decision 2014/145/CFSP until 22 September 2029. Previously, the sanctions regime had normally been renewed every six months. The new decision therefore replaces the established six-month renewal cycle with a period of 36 months.
For individuals and entities currently subject to EU sanctions, this is more than a technical change. The three-year extension raises an important legal question: Can the extension itself be challenged before the General Court of the European Union because it weakens the system of periodic review and judicial protection that previously accompanied EU sanctions listings?
There is not yet a judgment of the EU Courts answering this question. However, existing case law provides several arguments which may become relevant in future proceedings.
What exactly changed on 22 September 2026?
It is important to distinguish between Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. Decision 2026/2161 amended Article 6 of Decision 2014/145/CFSP so that the Decision now applies until 22 September 2029.
Regulation 269/2014 itself is not subject to that expiry date. It continues to contain the directly applicable asset-freezing measures and the individual sanctions list in Annex I.
The Regulation also continues to provide for reviews of individual listings. Under Article 14(3) of Regulation 269/2014, the Council must review its decision where observations are submitted or substantial new evidence is presented. Article 14(4) further provides that the list in Annex I must be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every twelve months.
The legal issue is therefore not that listed persons will receive no review whatsoever until 2029. The more difficult question is whether these review mechanisms provide the same protection as the previous system of formal six-month renewals.
EU restrictive measures are provisional by nature
The starting point can be found in established case law of the General Court. The EU Courts have repeatedly held that restrictive measures are measures of a “precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature.” Their continued legality depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which justified their adoption continue to exist and whether maintaining the measures remains necessary in order to achieve their objective.
The General Court expressed this principle, inter alia, in Yusef v Commission, Case T-306/10. Subsequent judgments have repeatedly confirmed that, when sanctions are reviewed, the Council must carry out an updated assessment of whether their continuation remains justified.
The General Court has expressly relied on the six-month period
The previous six-month duration was not merely an administrative practice. It has formed part of the General Court's own analysis of the proportionality of sanctions.
The six-month duration has also played an express role in the General Court’s assessment of proportionality. In Moshkovich v Council, Case T-283/22, the Court first observed that the restrictive measures applied for six months and were kept under constant review and were therefore “temporary and reversible” (para. 166). When subsequently assessing proportionality, the Court expressly relied on that finding and concluded that, because the restrictions were temporary and reversible and were accompanied by possibilities for exemptions, the disadvantages caused to the applicant were not disproportionate to the importance of the objectives pursued (para. 173).
The limited duration of the measures was therefore not merely relevant to their formal character as provisional measures. It formed part of the Court’s reasoning when concluding that the interference with the applicant’s rights was proportionate.
A three-year individual listing is unprecedented in EU sanctions practice
A three-year duration for individual listings also appears exceptional in the broader context of EU sanctions law. Under other sanctions regimes, the Council has generally distinguished between the duration of the underlying legal framework and the duration of individual restrictive measures. For example, under the Cyber Sanctions Regime under Decision (CFSP) 2019/797, the framework may remain in force for several years, while the individual listings are renewed only for one year. The same approach can be seen under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime and the Chemical Weapons Sanctions Regime.
A similar pattern exists in relation to Russia. The economic sanctions under Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 were most recently extended only for twelve months. Against that background, the three-year extension under Decision (CFSP) 2026/2161 appears to mark a significant departure from the Council’s established practice regarding the prospective duration of restrictive measures.
This does not establish that one year constitutes an absolute legal maximum for individual listings. However, the Council’s own practice suggests that one year has so far functioned as the regular outer benchmark for such measures. That practice strengthens the proportionality argument that a prospective extension from six months to three years requires particular justification.
Why did six-month renewals matter for judicial protection?
The previous renewal mechanism also had an important procedural consequence. Every six months, the Council had to take a new decision if it wished to continue the sanctions regime. In connection with those periodic reviews, new legal acts maintaining individuals and entities on the sanctions list were regularly adopted. A person whose listing was maintained could challenge those acts directly before the General Court under Article 263 TFEU.
This meant that the Council itself periodically created a new legal act whose legality could be reviewed by the Court. The listed person did not necessarily have to initiate a separate administrative reconsideration procedure merely in order to obtain a new decision.
This distinction is important because sanctions proceedings before the General Court frequently concern not only an original listing but also subsequent acts maintaining the applicant on the sanctions list. If such an action succeeds, the General Court can annul the relevant maintaining acts insofar as they concern the applicant.
The acts giving continued legal effect to the individual listing are therefore themselves subject to annulment.
What changes under a three-year system?
The extension until September 2029 removes the need for a new general renewal of Decision 2014/145/CFSP every six months. Individual review obligations remain. But the automatic six-month procedural cycle no longer operates in the same manner. This changes the position of a listed person.
Instead of receiving a new maintaining act as part of a six-month renewal cycle, a person may increasingly have to initiate a reconsideration procedure by submitting observations, new evidence and a request for delisting. The Council must then consider whether the listing should be maintained.
A negative decision may, depending on its content and legal effects, be capable of being challenged before the General Court. But this route is structurally different from a direct action against the legal acts maintaining the sanctions.
Why a delisting request may not provide equivalent judicial protection
A judicial challenge against a refusal to delist is not necessarily equivalent to an action against a fresh maintaining act. If a listed person challenges a maintaining act and succeeds, the General Court may annul the relevant Council act insofar as it concerns that person.
By contrast, where proceedings concern a Council decision refusing a request for delisting, the Court may annul that refusal if the conditions for judicial review are met and the refusal is unlawful. But the General Court cannot substitute itself for the Council and itself take the administrative decision to remove the person from the sanctions list. Nor can it issue an injunction ordering the Council to delist the applicant. Under Article 266 TFEU, it is for the Council to take the measures necessary to comply with the judgment.
Moreover, annulment of a refusal to delist does not automatically amount to annulment of the pre-existing legal acts under which the person's listing continues to have effect. This creates a material difference in the immediacy and effectiveness of judicial protection, which is hard to justify before the principle of effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The annual review under Regulation 269/2014 remains important
The Council has a significant counterargument. Article 14(4) of Regulation 269/2014 continues to require the sanctions list to be reviewed regularly and at least once every twelve months. In addition, Article 14(3) requires a review where observations or substantial new evidence are submitted.
The Council may therefore argue that the move to a three-year duration does not undermine effective protection because individual listings remain subject to regular reassessment. The strength of that argument may depend significantly on how these reviews are conducted in practice. In particular, it may become relevant whether annual reviews lead to genuine individual reassessments and whether they result in legal acts against which affected persons can obtain effective judicial review.
A statutory obligation to review a listing is not necessarily identical to a mechanism which periodically produces a new maintaining act capable of direct annulment.
Has the Council sufficiently explained the move from six months to three years?
Decision 2026/2161 gives reasons for maintaining the sanctions regime. The Council refers to the continuation of actions by the Russian Federation which, in its assessment, violate fundamental rules of international law and concludes that the restrictive measures should remain in force.
That reasoning addresses the question why sanctions should continue. A separate question is whether it sufficiently explains why the established six-month renewal period should be replaced by 36 months. The two questions should not necessarily be treated as identical.
The continued existence of circumstances justifying restrictive measures may support their continuation. It does not automatically explain why the institutional and procedural mechanism governing their continuation should be changed from six months to three years. This is particularly relevant because the six-month duration has previously been relied upon by the General Court itself when characterising sanctions as temporary and reversible.
The adequacy of the Council's reasoning may therefore become an additional issue in future litigation.
Can listed persons challenge the new three-year extension?
Persons currently subject to EU restrictive measures should consider carefully whether Decision (CFSP) 2026/2161 and the relevant acts maintaining their individual listing create grounds for judicial challenge. Such proceedings would raise both questions of admissibility and substantive EU law.
Potential arguments may concern, in particular:
the provisional character of EU restrictive measures;
proportionality under Article 52(1) of the Charter;
effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter;
the difference between periodic maintaining acts and administrative delisting procedures; and
the adequacy of the Council's reasoning for replacing a six-month renewal cycle with a 36-month period.
Whether these arguments will ultimately succeed has not yet been determined by the EU Courts.
Strict time limits for challenging the September 2026 measures
The important point for affected persons is that the new expiry date of 22 September 2029 does not extend the time limit for challenging the September 2026 measures.
Under Article 263(6) TFEU, an action for annulment must in principle be brought within two months of notification of the measure to the applicant or, where the time limit runs from publication in the Official Journal, of its publication. If Decision (CFSP) 2026/2161 was individually notified on 22 September 2026, the two-month period, together with the additional 10 days on account of distance under Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, would expire on 2 December 2026.
If there was no individual notification and the time limit therefore runs from publication in the Official Journal on 22 September 2026, Article 59 of the Rules of Procedure provides that the period is calculated from the end of the fourteenth day following publication. Together with the two-month period under Article 263(6) TFEU and the additional 10 days under Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure, the time limit would therefore expire on 16 December 2026.
The precise starting point must nevertheless be verified in each individual case, in particular by determining whether and when the measure was individually notified.
Conclusion
The Council's decision of 22 September 2026 is not simply a routine extension of the existing sanctions regime.
Changing the renewal period from six months to three years alters a structural feature of the system which has previously served two important purposes: it required the Council regularly to reconsider whether sanctions should continue, and it repeatedly generated new legal acts capable of direct judicial review.
At the same time, the General Court has previously relied expressly on the six-month duration and constant review of EU sanctions when holding that the resulting restrictions were temporary and reversible.
The transition to a 36-month period therefore raises substantial questions concerning the provisional character of restrictive measures, proportionality and effective judicial protection.
For persons and entities currently listed under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, the change should consequently not be understood merely as an administrative extension until 2029. It may itself become an important issue in proceedings before the General Court of the European Union.
Legal advice and representation in EU sanctions matters
KRONSTEYN advises individuals and companies affected by EU restrictive measures, including sanctions under Regulation (EU) No 269/2014. Our work includes the assessment of EU sanctions listings, requests for reconsideration and delisting before the Council of the European Union, and representation in actions for annulment before the General Court of the European Union in Luxembourg.
Dr. Hendrik Müller-Lankow, LL.M. (UCL)
Rechtsanwalt (German Attorney-at-law) EU sanctions litigation | Delisting proceedings | General Court of the European Union
